



Cultural inertia: The effects of cultural change on intergroup relations and the self-concept

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ABSTRACT

Throughout the world, immigration and the ensuing political reactions have become dominant social problems in the 21st century. One contributor to these problems includes the continual social change. In the United States, ethnic minority populations are growing while the White majority is becoming proportionally smaller. It is proposed that change, in and of itself, can produce intergroup tension. Here, the concept of cultural inertia is introduced as one contributor to intergroup prejudice. Cultural inertia entails a resistance to change, unless change is already occurring. Change is perceived differently across groups as a function of how well the groups already match the current dominant culture. Cultural inertia causes differential preferences for cultural change as a function of the extent to which people identify with a cultural group, their sense of esteem for a cultural group, and the perception that a culture is (or is not) already changing. Three studies manipulated participants' perception of cultural change and show that cultural change influences inter-group prejudice, group esteem, and engagement with the culture. The implications of cultural inertia for models of intercultural ideologies are discussed.

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Introduction

Cultural change is a global reality. Large immigrant population movements, shifting international coalitions and intra-national population movements force societies to deal with constant cultural change. Adding to the pre-existing cultural diversity inherent to the United States' cultural landscape, the United States is now approximately 16% Latino (U.S. Census Bureau, 2011). Moreover, the recent immigration surge has become one of the most divisive issues in the country (Massey, 2010). How does this cultural change influence attitudes regarding those groups? The present studies investigate how the process of perceived cultural change itself influences intergroup relations and how groups interact with society.

Cultural change brings issues of intergroup relations, prejudice, cultural and self identity, and perceptions of society to the forefront. Although there are a number of ideological approaches to managing colliding cultures (Berry, 1984), *cultural assimilation* and *multicultural* ideologies dominate the debate in the United States (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). Berry actually proposed four ideologies, but very few people espouse marginalization and separation and are rarely discussed within the literature. Proponents of the *assimilation* interethnic ideology advocate that the best approach to managing differences

across cultures is for all cultures to assimilate to a dominant culture. Assimilation ideologies suggest that, through a common identification (e.g., American), attention is drawn away from ethnic group differences. Eliminating ethnic group boundaries thereby eliminates intergroup prejudice. Within this type of framework for the research presented here, color-blind ideologies are considered an assimilation type ideology (Plaut, Thomas, & Goren, 2009). Both the assimilation and color blind ideologies assert that eliminating or ignoring group differences is considered the appropriate path to amicable intergroup relations.

Conversely, a multicultural ideology holds that all cultures should retain their basic cultural norms, style, and language within a greater cultural framework (Berry, 1984). Individuals learn to adapt to other cultures. Under this model, prejudice is reduced through mutual acceptance and appreciation for group differences. The research presented here uses this cultural framework as a model for understanding societies as dynamic entities and extensions of the self. Because cultures are dynamic, one need not limit research to assimilation and multiculturalism as the only possible points along the continuum of cultural integration. Cultural inertia focuses attention to the movements and processes between the endpoints, and to the perceived pressures to conform to the cultural demands of others. It directs attention to how people perceive how group interaction and changing identities influence their status within the larger group dynamic. One might assume, for instance, that independent of group goals, assimilation generally occurs with few exceptions. Historically, this is generally true within the U.S. independent of those desires, however, people make conscious efforts to retain their cultural identity and the associated change and resistance to change can influence

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interaction patterns. Thus, the theoretical framework extends identity threat models to models of assimilation and multiculturalism by investigating the dynamic processes involved as groups interact.

Cultural inertia

Multiculturalism and assimilation ideologies make recommendations regarding how to manage one's cultural identity, but their implications are different for members of cultural minority and majority groups (Zárate & Shaw, 2010). For minority groups, assimilation means that minorities must change to accommodate the dominant majority culture and that the dominant culture will not accept the minority culture. Conversely, multicultural ideologies mean that minority groups can maintain their culture amidst an accepting majority culture. For members of majority groups, assimilation implies that they will be able to maintain their current cultural style without the need to change greatly to accommodate other groups. In contrast, multiculturalism might mean having to change to accommodate other groups. It is proposed that this change, in and of itself, contributes to negative intergroup attitudes. The research presented here identifies a common process driving prejudice toward outgroups from an ethnic majority and minority viewpoint. It is proposed that reactions to cultural change, or cultural inertia, underlie differential preferences for multicultural and assimilation ideologies. One can first identify the concept of inertia and adopt it to fit social psychological processes. According to Merriam and Webster (2008), inertia is a property of matter by which the object remains at rest or in uniform motion along the same trajectory unless acted upon by some external force. In the same way, cultural inertia is defined as the desire to avoid cultural change, or a change in trajectories, or conversely, desire cultural change once movement or change is already occurring. Cultural inertia suggests that groups resist change due to perceived pressure from outside forces.

Research and public opinion polls show that most majority group members expect ethnic minorities to assimilate quickly (Verkuyten, 2005). The primary message, then, is that minorities should change to resemble the majority group norm. Research within the lab shows that often, a common ingroup identity reduces prejudice (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998; Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1996). Within a common ingroup framework, identifying people as "American" should reduce prejudice, consistent with an assimilation perspective. It is also the case, however, that much of the research that supports that research has utilized majority group members. Similarly, research and polls also show that in general, ethnic minorities often desire a more multicultural society (Verkuyten, 2005). One possible conclusion, then, is that minorities are also avoiding change. Experimental research shows that often, affirming group distinctiveness reduces prejudice (Carpenter, Zárate, & Garza, 2007; Zárate, García, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004; Zárate & Garza, 2002). Asking ethnic minorities to ignore their group identity can foster reactivity and increase prejudice. That research has tended to use ethnic group participant samples. In essence, support for assimilation ideologies and multicultural ideologies are at least partially predicted by the same process, which is the desire to avoid change.

Conflict arises when one compares the self to the larger cultural norm. If an individual does not "fit" the cultural norm, there may be perceived pressure to change to fit the group norm (Zagefka & Brown, 2002), or discomfort at having to change. Those that do fit the norm may expect others to change to conform to the norm, or similarly, resist feeling the need to change to accommodate non-normative groups. Cultural inertia suggests that conflict arises partially from the push and pull of societal shifts. When groups integrate, it is often the case that there is a larger or dominant cultural group, and there are smaller and less prototypic groups. In the United States, for example, there is the dominant White Euro-American culture, and multiple

smaller ethnic/racial groups. With a cultural inertia framework, the dominant group is the more stable group that resists cultural change, whereas the smaller ethnic groups propose changing the environment (so they don't have to change). Within cultural inertia terms, one can think of the US White population as the rock that resists movement, and other groups as the forces that attempt to effect change. In this metaphor, majority groups are the inert force, and resisting cultural change and minority groups are the force for change — at the cultural level.

Not all change is alike

Change is resisted at multiple levels. At the group level, change is perceived differently as a function of where one is in the social hierarchy. Eibach and Keegan (2006) argue that the same cultural change, operationalized as minority gains, is often perceived as losses for most White Americans. Unfortunately, equivalent losses and gains are perceived differently (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Losses are subjectively more negative than equivalent gains are positive. Within an intergroup context, the perceptions of loss are most often due to the perceptions that economic benefits are a zero-sum process. If one group gains, it must be at the cost to the other group. Because even the same exact cultural change, which seems difficult to empirically identify or measure, would produce different negative and positive reactions based on how one relates to the status quo. Any cultural movement might by definition produce tension. Thus, change and resistance work together to produce prejudice and discrimination.

At the individual level, change is stressful (Holmes & Rahe, 1967). For instance, the Social Readjustment Rating Scale shows that more change in the past year is associated with greater stress risks. Even positive life changes, such as marriage or the birth of a child, produce stress. Related individual difference variables, like openness to new experiences (Caligiuri, Jacobs, & Farr, 2000), are expected to show complementary effects. Individuals who appreciate new experiences are hypothesized to be more welcome to the change brought about by immigration. Regarding intergroup relations, it has been proposed that political conservatives, compared to liberals, tend to be more prejudiced, partially because conservatives more often avoid change (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Within cultural inertia terms, the more one identifies with their group, the more they should resist change. Identification, then, might be seen as quite similar to being embedded or grounded to a particular spot, and therefore more resistant to cultural pushes.

Cultural inertia builds upon and integrates multiple closely related social psychological theories including the instrumental model of group conflict, acculturative fit, and system justification theory. Cultural inertia contributes to our understanding of prejudice by bringing together multiple related constructs and focusing on the processes between the endpoints of integration. The focus on the effects of perceived cultural change (the proposed causal concept) and when movement and change are desired versus resisted provided new directions in research. Before we continue our discussion of the tenets of cultural inertia, a discussion of these relevant frameworks and how cultural inertia is unique is necessary.

The instrumental model of group conflict asserts that perceptions of competition over scarce resources produce prejudice toward outgroups (Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998). Accordingly, the mechanism that drives prejudice is perceptions of competition over limited resources from an out-group. Although cultural inertia is consistent with the instrumental model of group conflict, cultural inertia posits that prejudice toward out-groups can be produced by perceptions of future cultural changes, irrespective of perceived competition from the source of cultural change. In fact, within cultural inertia terms, the primary fear is cultural change, not economic competition (and Experiment 2 here specifically eliminates economic competition as a

potential explanation for the presented findings). Believing that one's culture is being pushed to change as a result of some other entity is the driving force that produces prejudice, according to cultural inertia. Moreover, cultural inertia suggests that for majority groups, minority groups that intend to assimilate are most appreciated. Within economic competition models, assimilation means more competition, and therefore, more prejudice (Zárate et al., 2004).

Zagefka and Brown's (2002) notion of acculturative fit focuses on the compatibility of the acculturation attitudes of immigrants and members of the host country. This theory investigates the discrepancy between immigrant members' fit strategy and the perceived strategy of the majority population, or vice versa. A large discrepancy between immigrant and members of the host country's fit strategy produces negative intergroup relations. For example, acculturative fit assumes that if members of the host society and immigrant groups both have a preference for integration they will experience positive intergroup relations. Cultural inertia suggests, however, that if groups feel pushed to change they will react with prejudice toward the agents of change, unless they perceive that the culture is already changing, regardless of the acculturative strategy of these agents of change. Within a cultural inertia framework, fit incompatibility is problematic only when there are perceived pressures to conform. Poor fit is not considered problematic in more diverse cultures that are also stable. Moreover, poor fit is often an actual motive for some groups to consciously move to assimilate, especially when they have joined the larger group voluntarily. Rather than fit, cultural inertia focuses on how the perceptions of cultural change of the involved populations produce negative attitudes toward agents of change. Thus, cultural inertia suggests that prejudice develops at least in part from the perceived push to change rather than from some perceived differences (poor fit) on the part of the perceiver. Expanding upon the physics analogy, one might posit that for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. Thus, negative responses to pushes to change the environment might be perceived as reactivity.

Lastly, system justification theory focuses on the socio-cognitive underpinnings that lead people to resist change and justify inequality (Jost et al., 2003). Cultural inertia, on the other hand, analyzes the effects of perceiving that cultural change will occur. System justification theory provides insight into the psychological motives that produce resistance to cultural change, but cultural inertia helps explain what occurs when groups pose a threat to one's conservative ideology. Furthermore, cultural inertia deals with how people react when others pose a threat to their ability to engage in their cultural practices. The resistance to change suggested by cultural inertia is different than the types of change suggested by system justification type frameworks (Jost & Thompson, 2000; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In cultural inertia terms, the resistance is to change, per se, rather than any consciously motivated attempt to maintain the status quo.

Cultural inertia predicts differential reactions to cultural change depending on (a) the perception that people will have to change to accommodate other cultures, (b) the perception that a culture is changing or static, and (c) the extent to which people identify with their current cultural state. To the extent that one matches well with the dominant culture, one will resist cultural change and promote assimilation type ideologies (Zagefka & Brown, 2002). To the extent that one does not match the dominant culture, however, one will promote multicultural ideologies for the same reason — to resist change. Inertia is a property of both movement and stability. In a second hypothesis tested in Experiment 2, the concept of inertia holds that an object in motion will tend to stay in motion. Thus, cultural inertia suggests that some groups are actually anxious to change (voluntary immigrants) and some more dynamic cultures (New York City?) would probably react negatively at attempts to reduce change. Thus, the stress felt by poor fit and change can differ greatly as a function of the context.

Maintaining a group identity becomes particularly important for those who identify highly with the group, be it a majority or minority group. Crisp, Stone, and Hall (2006) demonstrate that group identity moderates prejudice reduction associated with common ingroup methodologies. High and low group-identifiers evaluated the ingroup and outgroup differently in response to the creation of a common identity. For those who identify strongly with a group, highlighting a common identity produced stronger ingroup bias. Low group-identifiers, however, evaluated outgroup members more favorably in response to the creation of a superordinate category. This effect was observed with both implicit and explicit measures. They interpreted this effect within a Social Identity theoretical framework; suggesting that a common identity is a threat to high-identifiers' sense of positive distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). For low-identifiers, however, this threat is irrelevant and the common ingroup predictions hold. Similarly, Morrison, Plaut, and Ybarra (2010) show that for White Americans, the threat of multiculturalism is greatest for Whites with a strong ethnic identity. Finally, highly identified White Americans, compared to their less highly identified counterparts, showed higher levels of Social Dominance Orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, expt 1) and demonstrated greater prejudice (expt 2) after the multicultural prime than after the color blind prime. From a cultural inertia perspective, this suggests that identity works as a social anchor, providing more resistance to change.

Limitations to the current empirical evidence and the current studies

The literature on models of cultural integration, like much of the social psychological literature, is heavily weighted toward the typical college student population. The studied population is predominately White/Euro-American. For example, the theoretical work on the common ingroup identity model is conducted mostly with a White sample. The studies that do use ethnic minority samples, however, also show that minorities often report appreciating diversity-based approaches. The support for assimilation or color blind ideologies, however, is more mixed. As recently reviewed by Morrison et al. (2010) experimental research shows occasional support for multicultural ideologies with White samples, but most poll data using community samples show support for an assimilation ideology. For example, a Quinnipiac University poll (2010) showed that 68% of respondents prefer stricter enforcement of laws against illegal immigration, whereas only 24% preferred an integration ideology. Thus, the rhetoric outside the college campus is that minorities must assimilate to match the White norm, whereas lab based research on college campuses shows that those who do have multicultural views also tend to be less prejudiced.

This research is to the best of our knowledge the first to have a sole focus of change with an ethnic minority population. The participant pool comes from a southwest sample where Latinos are the local majority, but are also a national minority. The population also tends to have a high group identity, which may make them more resistant to change than some other samples. Moreover, given the current political climate regarding immigration and border security, the participant pool is also well aware of the national attitudes regarding immigration and Latinos. Later research will turn the focus to White majority samples.

Three experiments test the tenets of the cultural inertia hypothesis. Experiment 1 tests how manipulated change influences prejudice toward an outgroup. Mexican American participants' perceptions of degree of cultural change in the US were manipulated and prejudice was measured. In Experiment 1, the agents of change were Mexican National immigrants. To the extent that Mexican immigrants will change US culture, it would support the broader Latino culture, meaning Mexican Americans would need to change less. From a cultural inertia perspective, movements that produce more US cultural change mean less cultural change on the part of native Latinos. It was

predicted that biasing ethnic minority participants to believe that culture is changing would also influence participants to express less prejudice toward the agents of change. Experiment 2 changes the process to test how the dominant local culture reacts to outside forces changing the local culture. Experiment 2 tests cultural inertia processes from a majority group perspective using an ethnic minority sample. In that instance, agents of change from an outside force that would change the local culture were predicted to produce more negative reactions (Morrison et al., 2010). Finally, Experiment 3 extends the research to test how perceptions of change influence how one perceives the group and how one believes others perceive the group.

Manipulated change

These experiments use a subtle manipulation of cultural change. Participants are given various questions regarding social change and the endpoints are manipulated across experimental conditions. Some participants are given end points that suggest no change to at most, little cultural change, suggesting a static culture. This models an assimilated society in which cultural groups are changing to fit a stable dominant group norm. Others are given end points that suggest tremendous change, and at the very least, little change, suggesting a dynamic culture. This suggests that the cultural norms are changing tremendously, which also means that minorities do not have to change. For those in the static (no change) condition, the highest degree of change they can agree to is the least amount of change the participants in the dynamic culture condition can agree to. Because the end points are reasonable endpoints, the scales bias participants to self-ascribe to either a relatively great amount of change or very little change. Participants are not given misleading information, which can often produce reactivity. These manipulations conceptually complement change to models of assimilation and multiculturalism. In particular, for the Latinos in Experiments 1 and 3, static cultures reflect an assimilated society. Through minority group change, society will become more assimilated. In contrast, no change means that society remains multicultural. In Experiment 2, the power of the group majority is tested. In particular, within a local culture framework, Latinos are the local numerical majority, and a new group is framed as changing the local culture. Thus, in that situation, it is proposed that the same students will now desire a static culture – to avoid having to change. Finally, the local context is such that there is often some degree of animosity between Mexican Americans and Mexican Nationals.

In Experiment 1, individual differences in Attitude and Behavioral Openness (Caligiuri et al., 2000) were measured. Individual differences in openness to change were expected to mirror experimental manipulations of change. It was hypothesized that high openness to change would predict less prejudice. Also, Collective Self Esteem (CSE: Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) was measured to identify the impact of cultural inertia on ethnic minorities' attitudes toward their own group.

Experiment 1

Differences in attitudes toward immigration in the US are influenced by different factors including immigrant geographic concentration (Kohut, Suro, Keeter, Escobar, & Doherty, 2006), perceived group differences and similarities (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000), and ethnocultural background (Zarate et al., 2004). Cultural inertia predicts that, for ethnic minorities, prejudice toward an immigrant group is reduced when people believe that a culture is already changing. Following a multicultural model of integration, as different ethnic groups merge, each cultural group retains basic norms of their culture (Zárate & Shaw, 2010). A multicultural ideology would contend that diverse cultural norms and styles should be celebrated. Therefore, we expect Mexican Americans would display less prejudice toward Mexican immigrants because a

“multicultural US” would support diversity, thereby reducing the need of the Mexican-American participants to change to fit White American customs. To test this basic hypothesis, Mexican American participants were expected to respond with reduced bias toward Mexican immigrants when they perceive that U.S. culture is already changing to accommodate Latinos. It also tested correlations between openness and prejudice toward Mexican immigrants to test how individual differences in openness to cultural change relate to less bias toward Mexican immigrants.

Methods

Design

This experiment was a single factor design (cultural change ideology) with three levels, including a static culture, a dynamic culture, and a control condition. The primary dependent variable was prejudice toward Mexican immigrants. The correlations between attitudinal and behavioral openness and prejudice toward Mexican immigrants were also tested.

Participants

Sixty-nine American-born Mexican American students were recruited from Introductory Psychology classes. The final sample included 42 females (61%) and 27 males (39%). Their average age was about 19 years ($M = 19.26$, $SD = 2.52$).

Materials and procedure

Cultural change manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three cultural change conditions and completed a change perception manipulation. The purpose of the manipulation was to bias participants to believe that U.S. culture is already changing (or not changing) to accommodate Mexican culture. Participants were primed to believe that U.S. culture is changing to accommodate Mexican culture (dynamic condition) or that Mexicans are changing to assimilate to the dominant U.S. culture (static condition). The manipulation was presented as a measure of participants' opinions of current culture. A sample item from this manipulation is: “How are the beliefs and values of this country changing as a function of the mix of traditional U.S. and Latino beliefs and values?”

To manipulate perceptions, the endpoints of this scale were varied such that those in the dynamic condition were given the opportunity to rate U.S. culture as “changing somewhat” to “changing drastically” on a seven-point scale (or similarly valued end-points, depending on the item). Participants did this for nine items. Participants in the static condition were given the opportunity to rate U.S. culture as “not changing at all” to “changing somewhat”, also on a 7 point scale. Finally those in a control condition were able to rate U.S. culture as “not changing at all” to “changing drastically” on a thirteen-point scale that included both sets of end points. The response options were scaled such that the least one can “change” in the dynamic condition is the most one can change in the static condition. Appendix 1 includes the items with the end points suggesting greater changes. The only manipulation included the different end-points across the various conditions. The introductory paragraph outlining, in positive terms, both ideologies, remained constant across conditions.

Attitude and behavioral openness. Individual differences in attitudes toward change were measured via the Attitude and Behavioral Openness Scale (Caligiuri et al., 2000). This 10-item scale measures participants' attitudes toward change through items such as: “Traveling the world is a priority in my life” on a five-point scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. The alpha reliability for the openness scale was ($\alpha = .75$) in this sample.

Prejudice toward Mexican immigrants. Participants' prejudice toward Mexican immigrants was measured with Stephan, Ybarra, and

Bachman's (1999) prejudice measure. With this measure, participants were asked to rate 11 emotions toward Mexican immigrants (e.g. approval, hatred, rejection) on a ten-point scale. The alpha reliability of this scale was ($\alpha = .83$) in this sample.

Demographics form. Finally, participants completed a demographic information sheet. Information collected based on the demographic sheet included age, ethnicity, place of birth, duration of residence in the United States, class rank, gender, yearly household income, political party affiliation, and mother and father's education level. Afterwards participants were debriefed and thanked for their participation in the experiment.

Results

Experiment 1 tested the Culture Inertia hypothesis through two different tests. First, it measured prejudice toward outgroup agents of change as a function of the belief that U.S. culture is already changing. A single factor Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed a difference across change conditions, $F(2, 66) = 4.25, p = .0185$. Follow up *t* tests revealed that participants in the dynamic condition expressed significantly less prejudice ($M = 2.76, SD = .98$) toward Mexican immigrants than participants in the static condition ($M = 3.73, SD = 1.43$), $t(37) = 2.65, p = .01$. Participants in the dynamic condition also expressed less prejudice toward Mexican immigrants than participants in the control condition ($M = 3.52, SD = 1.14$), $t(36) = 2.30, p = .024$. These results support the basic tenet of cultural inertia that, if people believe that a culture is already changing, they express less prejudice toward agents of cultural change.

In addition to prejudice reduction via the perception that a culture is already changing, cultural inertia predicts that resistance to cultural change contributes to the expression of prejudice. Congruently, participants' scores on Attitude and Behavioral Openness, or individual differences in attitudes toward cultural change, related negatively to intergroup prejudice, $r(57) = -.46, p = .0004$. Attitudes toward openness to change did not differ across conditions, nor did attitudes toward openness influence prejudice differentially across conditions (all $F_s < 1$).

Summary

The findings support the hypothesis that Mexican American participants will express less prejudice toward Mexican immigrants when led to feel as though the U.S. culture is already changing. Furthermore, greater openness is associated with less prejudice toward agents of cultural change, thus supporting the basic tenet of cultural inertia that resistance to change at least partially drives prejudice. These results are congruent with past research showing that ethnic minorities express less prejudice in reaction to multicultural, as opposed to assimilation ideologies about cultural change (Verkuyten, 2005; Zárate & Garza, 2002).

The manipulations included only modified end points on a perceived change measure. The items were intended to produce perceptions of cultural change. These findings suggest that reactions to others are due in part to the fear one will need to change to accommodate others. Change, not intergroup differences, was manipulated. Thus, the belief that one will be forced to change to adapt to others may drive prejudice toward that group. Conceptually, these results support a more general form of motivated political conservatism (Jost et al., 2003) in which one predictor of negative outgroup attitudes is resistance to change. Political affiliation did not predict attitudes, but the sample characteristics may not have allowed a fair test of that hypothesis. Consistent with our overall hypothesis, at the individual difference level, greater openness to change produced fewer negative evaluations of the agents of change, and this was consistent across conditions. Nor did the manipulations influence participants'

openness to change, suggesting that as hypothesized by Caliguri et al., openness to new experiences is a stable individual difference measure not easily influenced by manipulations.

Experiment 2

Experiment 1 demonstrates that minorities' perception that they are living in a dynamic, accommodating society causes them to express less prejudice toward Mexican immigrants. The goal of Experiment 2 is to determine if the reverse is true. Specifically, Experiment 2 creates a scenario in which the same Mexican American sample becomes the majority culture. These studies are conducted in El Paso, TX, which also has a major army base (Ft. Bliss). Due to congressionally mandated base closures and realignments in the US Army, the city of El Paso is receiving massive influxes of soldiers across several waves in the next few years. The following paradigm capitalizes on that change and makes it so that El Paso natives are the majority culture rather than the minority culture. In Experiment 2, participants were led to believe that the incoming military population will either change the local culture, or will quickly assimilate to the local culture. Cultural inertia predicts that when El Paso culture is the salient/majority culture, the same sample from study 1 will express less prejudice toward outgroups when their culture is perceived as static and more prejudice when it is perceived as changing due to an external force. Now the force acting on society becomes the society being acted upon.

One important point of cultural inertia is the hypothesis that externally motivated change can be aversive to a majority group. Therefore, in addition to testing the other aspect of the cultural inertia hypothesis, Experiment 2 has the added benefit of changing the outgroup from Mexican immigrants to a more amorphous group. Although people may have varying stereotypes of the incoming soldiers, the experimental materials did not specify the race or ethnicity of the soldiers and the incoming population. In fact, the base realignments are considered a positive economic boon for the city and the incoming population is officially welcomed. Therefore, this paradigm affords a test of cultural inertia that is relatively independent of people's attitudes toward individual outgroups. This also reinforces the idea that prejudice can result in part from the perception that one will have to change to accommodate an outgroup.

Another limitation associated with using Mexican immigrants as an outgroup is that people's attitudes toward Mexican immigrants are often affected by the perception that immigrants pose an economic or realistic threat for US citizens (Zárate et al., 2004). Therefore, it is possible that participants in Experiment 1 were reacting in part from the perception that a changing US society means that there will be more economic opportunity for everyone. Experiment 2 alleviates that concern and provides a stronger test of cultural inertia because the soldiers moving to El Paso has been framed as of being of great economic benefit to the El Paso community (Crowder, 2007).

Cultural inertia predicts that a stronger identification with one's own culture will predict a stronger resistance to change (Crisp et al., 2006; Morrison et al., 2010; Zárate & Garza, 2002). Therefore, Experiment 2 also adds to the findings in Experiment 1 by measuring the impact of group identity on reactions to a dynamic or static society. Local citizens should be most invested in preserving the local culture, whereas individuals who recently moved to the city should be in a state of cultural movement and desire more movement. Thus, cultural inertia predicts that stronger group identification will predict more prejudice toward the soldiers when participants believe that the soldiers will change El Paso's cultural landscape. In cultural inertia terms, individuals new to the city are in the process of change. Thus, manipulations designed to reduce change should produce greater reactivity than manipulations designed to continue change. Therefore, cultural inertia suggests that non-natives should respond differently that should be met with greater resistance.

In sum, Experiment 2 makes multiple contributions. First, it tests whether individuals of majority groups prefer and express less prejudice in static societies. Second, it moves tests of cultural inertia away from Mexican–American/Mexican immigrant relations to a group that is not as clearly defined by race or culture. Third, it eliminates realistic threat-based and self-interest explanations for the effects in Experiment 1. Fourth, it tested the extent to which measures of group identification moderate reactions to cultural change. It predicts that when El Paso cultural identification is high and subjects perceive their culture as changing, El Pasoans will express more prejudice toward the incoming military population, and that stronger group identification with El Paso culture will predict stronger prejudice toward the incoming military. It also suggests that for non-native El Paso residents, the fact that they have moved recently puts them in a state of movement, meaning they should desire still more movement. Thus, it was predicted that they would show greater desire for movement, meaning less prejudice in the dynamic condition.

Methods

Design

Similar to Experiment 1, this experiment used a three condition (change condition; static versus dynamic versus control) design across native El Pasoans versus those new to the city. In addition to comparisons across change conditions, the analysis also considered group identification as a predictor of the two measures of prejudice (Attitudes and Symbolic Threat).

Participants

One hundred seventy three students were recruited from the Psychology participant pool in exchange for partial course credit. The mean age of participants was 19.48 ($SD = 3.05$). The local participants included 143 Mexican Americans, and the sojourn students included 30. Sixty-one percent of the participants were female and 39% were male. Upon arrival, participants were administered an informed consent form and were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions (dynamic, static, or control). Participants then completed a basic demographic sheet. They were given their respective articles and completed the cultural manipulation. Following the manipulation, they completed the Symbolic Threat Scale, attitudes measure, and then the Collective Self-Esteem scales for the identities of their ethnic group and as local citizens. All participants were then debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

Materials

Cultural change manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three cultural change conditions. In this study, participants were manipulated to think that El Paso's society would have to change to accommodate the incoming population (dynamic society), that the military would change to accommodate local culture (static society), or that the two groups would not interact (control condition). Perceptions of society as dynamic or static were manipulated in two ways. First, all participants read different articles corresponding to their experimental condition. These articles were purportedly from a newspaper that described the changes the cultural landscape and community would face as a result of an influx of the incoming military personnel and their families. In the first part of the articles, regardless of condition, participants were informed of a major base realignment about to take place in the city and that the realignment would go into effect within the next year. Other details were added to the article to make it seem more like a newspaper article (e.g. "the base realignment will affect other bases, such as Fort Bragg and Fort Hood as well"). The second half of the article varied across conditions and manipulated participants' perceptions of the implications of

the incoming military population for El Paso's local culture. The details of each article are explained separately by condition.

The second part of the manipulation was an eight-item measure of participants' beliefs about the extent to which the local culture would change as a function of the military family influx. This part of the manipulation mirrored the Experiment 1 manipulation. Perceptions of cultural change were manipulated, similar to Experiment 1, via manipulating the endpoints of the scales such that participants were only allowed to respond within a certain range. An example of an item included in this measure was: "The type of food I eat will..." Other items in this measure include, "The dynamics of my family will," and, "My culture will..."

In the "dynamic society" condition, participants were primed to think that El Paso culture would have to change to accommodate the incoming military population. This was accomplished by informing participants that the local culture and community would be changing to accommodate the incoming military population. For instance, in the second half of the article, participants in the change condition read: "Life in this city is expected to change drastically as a result of this realignment." Later in the article they read, "Jonathon Carmichael, a Fort Bliss official, was quoted as saying: 'It will be the responsibility of every local citizen to make this a place that is hospitable to the new incoming military personnel.'" On the questionnaire, the endpoints of the scale in the cultural change condition were manipulated to only allow participants to rate the local culture as "change slightly" to "change dramatically". For example, the item "The type of food I eat will..." participants could only respond from "The type of food I eat will change slightly" to "The type of food I eat will change dramatically."

The "static society" condition primed participants to think that the incoming military population would change to adapt to the local culture. In the second half of the article they read, "These soldiers... have expressed an eagerness to integrate fully into the musical, religious, culinary, and linguistic landscape of local culture." They then read, "The soldiers have been instructed to be sensitive to local culture." On the questionnaire, the participants were restricted to the choices of "not change" to "change moderately" which forced them to think there would be minimal change to the local culture. For instance, they were only allowed to respond within the range of, "The type of food I eat will not change at all" to "The type of food I eat will change moderately." As in Experiment 1, the most change one can report in this condition is the least possible change one can report in the dynamic condition.

The control condition's purpose was to induce participants to think that there would be minimal cultural contact between the local citizens and the military population. In the second half of the article, participants in the control condition read, "Life here is expected to stay the same after the realignment takes place." Then they read, "The local community can expect few changes because this contingent of soldiers was instructed to stay as close to the base as possible." Participants were informed that there would be minimal contact between the military and local communities because the military populations are expected to create their own cultural community within the military base and are not expected to interact much with the local community. The minimal contact control condition mirrors some real-life instructions often given to military families. Finally, in the control condition participants were allowed the opportunity to respond to the full range of responses, which were "not changing" to "changing dramatically".

Prejudice measures. Prejudice was measured in two ways. First, participants' level of symbolic threat was measured using an adapted version of the Symbolic Threat Scale (Stephan et al., 1999). Eight items were used and participants were given a seven-point scale in which participants indicated their opinions about how they expected local culture to be affected by the incoming military outgroup. An example of an item

on the scale is: “Incoming military personnel from other parts of the United States will undermine local culture.” This scale had acceptable psychometric properties ($\alpha = .59$) in this sample. Participants’ prejudice toward the incoming military population was assessed using a twelve item, seven-point scale in which participants indicated their emotions (e.g. acceptance, approval, hostility) toward the incoming military population (Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald, & Tur-Kaspa, 1998). A one on the scale indicated that they did not feel that emotion toward the military at all, while a seven on the scale indicated that they felt that emotion toward the military extremely (e.g. no acceptance to extreme acceptance). The alpha reliability of this measure was .83.

Group identification. The extent to which participants identified with El Paso culture was collected using the “identification” subscale of the CSE scale. An example of an item included in the sixteen-item scale is: “The group I belong to is an important reflection of who I am.” This scale consisted of sixteen items on a seven-point scale, which ranged from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The alpha reliability of this scale was .85.

Results

The central prediction for Experiment 2 was that participants native to the local majority culture would express more prejudice toward incoming military populations when they were led to believe that they would have to change culturally to accommodate those groups, compared to the other conditions. Moreover, it was predicted that this effect would be strongest for those who identify strongly with the culture being changed. Conversely, it was also predicted that participants who were not native to a culture would express more prejudice toward the incoming military population when they were led to believe that there would be no interaction across cultures. Individuals in a state of movement were expected to react negatively to perceived segregation across cultures.

The first analysis entailed a 3 (change condition) by 2 (hometown of the participant) by 2 (prejudice measure) design. The prejudice measures (symbolic threat and prejudice) were treated as a within subject repeated measures factor, whereas the other two factors were treated as between subject factors. This analysis produced only a condition by hometown between subjects effect $F(2, 167) = 5.65, p = .0042$. The within participant prejudice measures did not differ significantly from each other. Univariate ANOVAs showed similar effects for the prejudice measure ($F(2, 167) = 4.31, p = .02$) and for symbolic threat ($F(2, 167) = 3.90, p = .022$).

To test the specific hypotheses, *t*-tests from the previous SAS GLM procedure are reported, contrasting the groups across each condition. For the prejudice measure, as predicted, local participants expressed more prejudice than did the sojourn students when participants were led to believe that they would have to change to accommodate the military population ($t(53) = 2.45, p = .015$). Responses did not differ, however, in the condition in which participants were led to believe that the military population would change ($t(65) = .49, ns$). When told that the military population would remain isolated, responses differed marginally, which the sojourn population expressing more prejudice ($t(49) = 1.72, p = .085$). See Fig. 1 for the associated means.

Symbolic threat responses were strikingly similar to the prejudice measures. As predicted, when told that El Paso citizens would have to change to accommodate the local culture, local participants expressed more threat ($t(49) = 2.67, p = .008$) than did the non-local students. When told the military population would adapt to the local culture, responses did not differ across conditions ($t(65) = 1.01, ns$). When led to believe that the military population would remain isolated, responses again differed across conditions, ($t(49) = 2.15, p = .033$). See Fig. 2 for the associated means.

It was also predicted that group identity would moderate those effects, such that individuals who identify highly with their hometown




Fig. 1. Prejudice responses as a function of population and experimental condition.

would show more symbolic threat and prejudice to having to change to accommodate this population. This effect was theorized to be limited to local city natives. To test this, symbolic threat and prejudice scores were analyzed with condition as one factor and city identification as a moderator. That analysis failed to produce a significant interaction between condition and city identity for symbolic threat ($F(2, 135) = 2.0, p = .14$) or prejudice ($F(2, 135) = .95, ns$). It was the case however, that higher ID scores correlated positively with expressed symbolic threat only in the city changes condition $r(44) = .29, p = .05$. The ID scores did not correlate with symbolic threat in the other two conditions (Military changes, $r(65) = .18, p = .16$, and no contact $r(40) = -.13, p = .41$). The prejudice measures demonstrated the same pattern. Identification correlated positively prejudice only in the city changes condition $r(44) = .38, p = .01$. The ID scores did not correlate with prejudice in the other two conditions (Military changes, $r(57) = .08, p = .55$, and no contact $r(40) = -.17, p = .27$) (Fig. 3).

Discussion

The results of Experiment 2 are striking for multiple reasons. First, the influx of military personnel has been framed as an economically beneficial change. Here, however, leading members of a majority




Fig. 2. Symbolic threat as a function of population and experimental condition.




Fig. 3. Volunteerism as predicted by CSE and experimental condition.

culture to believe that their culture will have to change increases prejudice, even when that change is portrayed as economically beneficial. Second, these effects are different for those who identify with the local culture versus those who do not. Third, these data suggest that even groups that are typically considered a minority will resist change when they are the majority group. Thus, it is probably not the case that by definition, minority groups desire a multicultural world. Rather, these results suggest that groups simply avoid change, and most often, a multicultural society affords less change for minority groups. Fourth, the data suggest that the effects of cultural change on prejudice exist relatively independently of race or culture. Even if members of the majority group do not know the race or culture of an out-group, they express more prejudice when they feel that the outgroup will change their culture. In this case Mexican Americans (a traditionally underrepresented group) reacted with more prejudice when they believed that their culture was changing or would have to change. This contrasts with those participants who believe that the incoming group will assimilate to their culture. Thus, individuals are happy to welcome new populations to their culture, as long as they do not have to change their culture to do so.

These data also build on the findings from Experiment 1. Specifically, they allowed for direct comparisons between majority and minority reactions to cultural change by comparing native El Pasoans' reactions to cultural change with non-native El Pasoans' reactions. The results confirmed that members of majority cultures are more open to other groups when it means that their culture will not change. In Experiment 1, it could be argued that the reduction in prejudice toward Mexican immigrants resulted from a sense of identity affirmation. Participants may have felt affirmed by the fact that the US was changing to accommodate Latinos (more generally) and, therefore, expressed less prejudice. In this study, there was no indication that the non-native El Pasoan's culture (specifically) would be more valued or affirmed in the changing El Pasoan's culture. Thus, biasing people to believe that they would have to change to accommodate a different group led them to express more prejudice than biasing them to believe that others would change to accommodate their culture.

Experiment 3

Experiment 1 supports the hypothesis that prejudice reduction toward agents of cultural change results from a perception that U.S. culture is already changing and Experiment 2 suggest that minority cultures prefer a changing society and majority cultures prefer a static society. Experiment 3 predicts that the reason that this happens is that a changing society provides members of minority groups hope

that their culture will be valued and accepted in the larger cultural framework. Experiment 3 investigates how cultural inertia concepts influence how minority cultures (Mexican Americans) feel about their own group within the broader society (The United States). This is accomplished in Experiment 3 by using similar manipulations as the previous experiments to bias perceptions of cultural change, but instead of measuring prejudice and attitudes toward other groups, the effects of change and self-perceptions are measured. This is accomplished by measuring (1) participants feelings about their own culture (2) participants feelings of hope about living in the United States, (3) participants' engagement in activities that

Imagine US culture in 20 years. In twenty years, how much will children need to speak another language in order to be competitive?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Being bilingual will be very important							Speaking another language will be somewhat important
How are the beliefs and values of this country changing as a function of the mix of traditional US culture and Mexican immigrants?							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
US culture is changing dramatically							US culture is changing somewhat
US culture is							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Becoming highly diverse							Becoming somewhat diverse
In response to the recent immigrant surge,							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Americans are changing dramatically							Americans are changing somewhat
How are the beliefs and values of Mexican immigrants regarding moral and religious issues changing as a function of American culture?							
Mexican immigrants are							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Actively maintaining their diversity							Maintaining some diversity
Mexican immigrants are causing the rules and norms of American society to change.							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Agree strongly							Agree somewhat
How much is the job market in America being affected by Mexican immigrant workers?							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
US job market is changing dramatically							US job market is changing somewhat
How much are American politics affected by Mexican immigrants?							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Minorities have great political power							Minorities have some political power
How much is America's interpersonal style changing because of Mexican immigrants?							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
US style is changing dramatically							US style is changing somewhat
How much are Mexican immigrants causing American culture to change to accommodate them?							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
US culture is changing dramatically to accommodate							US culture is changing somewhat to accommodate them
Imagine US culture in 20 years. How much will current immigration change American culture if immigration continues at its present rate?							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
US culture will change dramatically							US culture will change somewhat
Imagine US culture in 20 years. How much do you anticipate having to change your lifestyle to accommodate more immigrants?							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Lifestyle will change dramatically							Lifestyle will change somewhat
Imagine US culture in 20 years. Because of the various cultural groups, how will your children's culture be different from yours?							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Future culture will be dramatically different							Future culture will change somewhat

advocate for their culture, and (4) measuring the extent to which participants feel that they will have to change their own identity to live and move in the United States. If cultural inertia holds, participants in a minority culture (Mexican Americans) should feel more positively toward their own culture, more hopeful about living in the US society, become more engaged in advocating for their culture, and feel less like they will have to change their identity to live and move in the larger American cultural framework when they are led to believe that the culture of the US is changing to accommodate their culture or that it is already in a state of change.

Methods

Participants and procedure

One hundred-five Introductory Psychology students were recruited to participate in a survey on current events. Only, Mexican American, U.S. citizen participants were included in the study. Nonetheless, there was some variability in the participants' ethnic background. Seventy-three participants (70%) were Mexican American, 22 (21%) were a Hispanic/Latino ethnic group other than Mexican-American, and 10 (10%) were a mix of Hispanic and White-American. Forty-five (43%) participants were male and 60 (57%) were female. The mean age was about 20 years ($M=20.1$, $SD=3.48$). Upon arrival, participants were randomly assigned to one of the three change conditions. After the manipulation, they were given the opportunity to sign up for student organizations, complete a measure of Collective Self-Esteem, the measure of support for pro-minority legislation, the measure of feelings about cultural change, and a demographics form.

Materials

Cultural change manipulations. The cultural change manipulations in this study were very similar to those in Experiment 1. There were only two small differences. First, similar to Experiment 2, the participants read vignettes that reinforced their perceptions that the culture is either changing or static. For instance, participants primed to believe that US culture is changing read:

“Although the United States is composed of people from different nations and cultures who speak many different languages and practice many different religions, the strong demographic shifts suggest that the U.S. is increasingly changing to accommodate Latino culture.”

After reading the vignette, participants completed the same change manipulation from Experiments 1 and 2. The only other difference was that the scale was changed to a six-point scale to prevent participants from just responding 4 on each item. Therefore, they responded to items such as “How much are the beliefs and values changing as a result of Latino culture” on a scale from 1 (changing somewhat) to 6 (changing dramatically).

In contrast, participants in the “Latinos change” condition read a vignette that suggested that Latinos were changing to accommodate the U.S.'s existing, dominant culture. For example, one part of this vignette in the “Latinos change” condition read:

Population estimates for the nation's future suggest even greater cultural assimilation towards traditional American culture. Sixty-five percent of the Latinos in the 2000 Census also labeled themselves “White”, suggesting that they see themselves assimilating quickly.

Participants in this condition then completed the same faux survey about cultural change, except with endpoints that implied that Latinos were changing to accommodate U.S. culture. For example

they responded to the same item, “How much are the beliefs and values of this country changing because of Latinos?” on a scale from 1 (not changing at all) to 6 (changing somewhat).

Participants in the control condition read an article that was similar in length but unrelated to cultural change (it presented census statistics on stay at home parents). Also, participants responded to the same faux survey with the full range of responses. For the item “How much are the beliefs and values of this country changing because of Latinos?” they responded on a scale from 1 (not changing at all) to 6 (changing dramatically).

Measures of minority engagement. Minority engagement was measured by the extent to which participants showed interest in getting involved with activist groups that advocate for minority issues. Participants were provided with a list of 12 student organizations with a short description of each. Participants were asked to look through the list and check which organizations they would be interested in joining. Embedded in this list were eight pro-Latino organizations (e.g. the League of United Latin American Citizens) and four filler organizations (e.g. The Miner Cycling Club). Participants were also given the opportunity to give their email to receive further information regarding these student organizations.

The second measure of minority empowerment was the extent to which participants supported pro-Latino legislation ($\alpha = .73$). On this measure, participants indicated their support for legislation regarding the preservation of non-English languages, celebration of a day dedicated to establishing trust among Americans of different ethnic backgrounds, recognizing Hispanic heritage month, nationalizing Latino holidays, and encouraging religious freedom for ethnic minorities on a scale from 1 (I would not support this resolution at all) to 6 (I would very much support this resolution).

Mexican Americans' perception of their standing in US society. The way that Mexican Americans' viewed their culture within the broader US framework was measured two ways. The first measure of minority empowerment was the Collective Self Esteem scale (CSE; $\alpha = .86$; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), which was used to capture how a changing society makes minority cultures feel about their own group.

The second measure of minority empowerment asked participants to respond to six items about the extent to which they felt they would be able to maintain their identity within the larger cultural framework in the United States ($\alpha = .60$). For example, they were asked to indicate: “To what extent will you, personally, have to change your cultural identity to accommodate a traditional American culture?” on a scale from 1 (I will not have to change at all) to 6 (I will have to change dramatically). The scale was modified from a seven point scale to a 6 point scale to eliminate the middle response. A separate item on this measure asked participants to indicate their feelings regarding cultural change in the United States. They were asked to respond to the item, “When you think about having to change to accommodate traditional American culture, how does it make you feel?” on a scale from 1 (resentful) to 6 (hopeful) scale. Lastly, participants answered demographic questions regarding their age, ethnicity, sex, education, class rank, and socioeconomic status.

Results

Cultural inertia makes separate predictions for Experiment 3. First, it predicts that for Latinos, the perception US culture is changing will cause them to feel more positive toward their own group. This hypothesis was tested by comparing the differences in CSE across change conditions with a single factor (change condition), 3 level ANOVA with follow-up planned comparison. Results revealed marginal support for this hypothesis, $F(2, 102) = 2.65$, $p = .0754$. As predicted, participants primed to believe that US culture is changing

had higher CSE ($M = 5.47, SD = .94$) than participants in the condition that led them to believe that Latinos would change to assimilate to the larger society ($M = 5.06, SD = .76; t(66) = 2.07, p = .04$), and marginally higher CSE than participants in the control condition ($M = 5.10, SD = .70$), $t(69) = 1.92, p = .06$. CSE scores did not differ for participants in the “Latinos change” condition and the control condition $t(71) = -.20, p = .84$. These results suggest that the perception that the US culture is changing increases Mexican Americans' esteem for their own culture, while the belief that they will have to change leads to a decrease in their ethnic identification.

From a cultural inertia perspective, a changing society gives minority groups hope that their culture will be valued and accepted in the larger cultural framework. Therefore, participants primed to believe that US culture is changing should come to believe that other cultures view Mexican American culture more positively than participants primed to believe that US culture is static. Therefore, we capitalized on the way that CSE is measured and conducted a post-hoc test of this hypothesis. CSE is actually composed of 4 subscales. Three subscales (identification, membership, and private importance) always correlate highly with each other with this sample, while the public self-esteem is distinct. In this study, the reported effect emerged more reliably for the “public” CSE subscale, $F(2, 102) = 6.22, p = .003$. This scale measures the extent to which participants believe that others think highly of their group. Participants in the “U.S. changes” condition had higher public CSE ($M = 5.08, SD = 1.18$), than participants in the “Latinos change” condition ($M = 4.18, SD = 1.12; t_{hsd}(66) = .90, p < .05$), and the control condition ($M = 4.32, SD = 1.09; t_{hsd}(69) = .76, p < .05$). There was also no difference between public CSE in the “Latinos change” and the control conditions, $t_{hsd}(69) = .14, p = n.s.$ Analyses of the other scales without public CSE revealed no significant differences across conditions $F(2, 102) = .78, p = .46$. Therefore, using this post-hoc analysis, the biggest change in CSE seems to be in how participants perceived others' opinion of Latino culture, rather than their opinions of their own culture.

If a changing society, in fact, creates the perception that minority cultures will be more accepted within a dominant culture, perceptions that a culture is changing to accommodate one's group should cause participants to feel more hopeful about living within the dominant culture. To test this we compared participants' feelings of hope and resentment across change conditions with a single factor, 3-level ANOVA. Participants' feelings about cultural change were affected by cultural change type, $F(2, 102) = 3.61, p = .03$. Participants in the “U.S. changes” condition felt more hopeful (less resentful) about changing to accommodate traditional U.S. culture ($M = 3.61, SD = 1.50$) than participants in the “Latinos change” condition, ($M = 2.82, SD = 1.30; t(66) = 2.58, p = .02$), and participants in the control condition ($M = 3.02, SD = 1.50; t(69) = 1.96, p = .06$). There was no difference in feelings about cultural change in the “Latinos change condition” compared to the control condition, $t(69) = -.67, p = .50$.

Cultural inertia also predicts that, when members of minority cultures feel that a society is changing, they will feel more empowered to advocate for their own culture. Specifically, this predicts that in the dynamic society condition, participants will be more likely to join pro-Latino student organizations than in the static society and control conditions, and that this would be particularly true for those high in CSE. We tested this hypothesis using multiple regression, regressing the mean number of Latino organizations that students signed up for on “cultural change condition” and CSE. This analysis yielded a significant cultural change condition \times CSE effect ($F(1, 99) = 3.96, p = .0222$). Simple slope analyses revealed that CSE predicted higher levels of support for joining pro-Latino organizations in the “U.S. changes” condition, $B = .87, SE = .36, t(32) = 2.40, p = .03$, and the control condition, $B = 1.61, SE = .44, t(35) = 3.66, p = .0008$, but not in the “Latinos change” condition, $B = -.21, SE = .50, t(32) = -.44, p = .66$. This

suggests that higher CSE predicts stronger involvement in pro-Latino when participants feel that the U.S. is changing to accommodate them, but not when they feel that they will have to change to accommodate the dominant U.S. culture. In contrast, the number of non-Latino organizations they volunteered for did not differ across conditions ($F(1, 99) = .13, ns$). Figure 3 presents the probability of joining any particular organization as a function of CSE and experimental condition.

The second hypothesis also predicted a similar condition \times CSE interaction for pro-minority legislation. Although stronger CSE did predict a higher likelihood of voting for pro-minority legislation, $B = .35, SE = .10, t(103) = 3.56, p = .0006$, the interaction was non-significant, $F(2, 99) = .22, p = .80$. Support for pro-Latino legislation did not differ across conditions.

Finally, cultural inertia predicts that minority cultures who believe that the culture is changing will feel less as though they have to change their identity to be able to live in American culture. Therefore, we compared the extent to which participants felt that they would have to change their identity to live and move in US culture. Results confirmed this hypothesis, $F(2, 102) = 3.55, p = .04$. Participants in the “U.S. changes” condition felt like they would have to change their identity less ($M = 2.50, SD = .77$) than participants in the “Latinos change” condition ($M = 2.91, SD = .72, t(66) = 2.32, p = .03$), and participants in the control condition ($M = 2.90, SD = .773, t(69) = 2.32, p = .02$). There was no difference in perceptions that participants would have to change their identity in the “Latinos change” condition and the control condition, $t(66) = .06, p = .95$.

Summary—Experiment 3

The results of this experiment imply that the perception that a society is changing influences not only prejudice and self-esteem, but also one's interaction with society. The results support the hypothesis that the perception that a culture is changing increases the extent to which they feel that the broader society values their culture as measured by the public collective self esteem scale. Priming a more dynamic culture also produced more hopeful and less resentful views of the US in the future. Priming participants high in collective self-esteem to believe that US culture is changing also produced higher civic engagement volunteering than when priming them to believe they will have to change. Just as importantly, Experiment 3 included items that also act as manipulation checks. Participants primed to believe that the US is changing felt that they will have to change less in the future than those primed to believe that they will have to change. These results have potentially important implications for intergroup relations. Specifically, previous research indicates that group affirmation reduces prejudice between groups (McGregor, Haji, & Kang, 2008; Zárate & Garza, 2002). They also have important implications for the preservation of people's cultural heritage. When people believe that US society will remain static, they may feel devalued, hopeless, and less motivated to advocate for their own culture.

General discussion

These studies, taken together, provide strong support for cultural inertia as a predictor of prejudice reduction and further evidence that minorities react with the least prejudice in the face of multicultural ideologies about cultural change. At a more general level, cultural inertia predicts that people will be generally averse to cultural change unless they perceive their culture as already changing. Experiment 1 supports the hypothesis that participants' perceptions that U.S. culture is already changing to accommodate Latino culture produces more positive attitudes regarding Mexican American immigrants by Mexican American participants. This was not a “straw man” prediction. Rather, attitudes of Mexican Americans regarding Mexican immigrants are not necessarily positive (Zárate et al., 2004) and moreover, these attitudes were directly influenced by the manipulations. Experiment 2 findings are a second direct test of

cultural inertia hypotheses. Experiment 2 changed the basic structure of the comparison. In Experiment 1, the participant pool population served as the cultural force that can change the larger society. In Experiment 2, the participant population served as the larger society. The results were equally consistent with the hypotheses. Forcing the majority group to change increased the expressed prejudice. Experiment 2 also eliminates possible confounds from Experiment 1. Specifically, change (or lack thereof) is independent of any financial or cultural benefit to the local population. Thus, the manipulations reduce any self perceived benefits. Still, the results are consistent with the tenets of cultural inertia.

Finally, Experiment 3 extends cultural inertia in important ways. Experiment 3 extends the first two studies to show that these processes extend directly to civic engagement and group identity issues. This suggests that the ability to maintain one's cultural identity empowers the group to become further involved in the culture in positive ways. It facilitates a positive group identity. It is also empowering in the sense that the group recognizes more positive group esteem from a public view.

Threat or affirmation?

Cultural inertia extends previous identity threat type models to investigate the processes involved between two cultural endpoints, assimilation and multiculturalism. One secondary goal was to investigate if having to move to resemble another culture is threatening, or knowing that one would not have to change (or that others are making efforts to accommodate your own culture) is affirming. It is possible that either group affirmation or group threat produced the reported effects. Leading Latino participants to believe that US culture is changing to accommodate other groups might empower them and affirm the group self-concept. This would produce heightened CSE in the multicultural condition. In contrast, leading Latino participants to believe that they will have to change to fit into the US society might in fact threaten the group identity, which would produce reduced CSE in the assimilation condition. In the first study, the multicultural condition was different from the control condition and the assimilation condition. Experiment 3 replicated that effect, and it was also the only study that included a measure designed to directly assess threat versus affirmation. Participants were asked if they felt hopeful versus resentful about the future. Participants led to believe that the US is changing to accept them were more hopeful (and less resentful) than participants in the other two conditions. That effect also matched that study's CSE results. Thus, preliminary results across studies 1 and 3 (Experiment 2 does not provide a test of that hypothesis) show support for an affirmation process. Future research, however, will need to more directly test the threat and affirmation hypotheses. One suspects, however, that it is not an "either/or" type answer. Rather, the answer is probably a combination of both hypotheses.

In addition to providing support for cultural inertia, these results provide further evidence that ethnic minorities prefer multicultural models of cultural interaction. Models such as The Common Ingroup Identity Model suggest that the best path to intergroup harmony is to eliminate categories and focus on how we are similar. These studies, together with Social Identity Theory, Group Distinctiveness Models, and the Mutual Identity Differentiation Model suggest that the focus on intergroup sameness can be problematic. People who identify highly with their group (Crisp et al., 2006; Morrison et al., 2010) and ethnic minorities (Zárate & Garza, 2002) may interpret attempts at creating common ingroups as threatening to their social identities. This threat to people's social identity and group distinctiveness may be resolved through multiculturalism. Specifically, ethnic minorities perceive multicultural approaches to cultural change as permission to feel good about and maintain their cultural practices with little effort to accommodate other cultures.

The presented results have both theoretical and societal consequences. From a theoretical standpoint, they reconcile two seemingly distinct ideas. How can attention to a common identity and to a subgroup identity reduce prejudice? It depends on how well one already fits the dominant culture. To the extent that one resembles the dominant culture well, attention to a common identity should produce less prejudice. This suggests less movement or need to accommodate to others. If one already fits the dominant culture, suggestions to change to fit other groups might threaten the cultural identity. If one is part of a cultural group that is distinct from the dominant group, however, movement toward a common identity suggests that one will have to change or possibly even abandon one's identity to fit the common identity. The onus is on the minority group to change culturally. That, in and of itself, might prove threatening, particularly if one has a strong identity with their salient group membership. Thus, assimilation and multiculturalism mean different things to different groups. The presented research shows that even within the same population, people show support for an assimilation versus multicultural society as a function of how well they already resemble the dominant group. The only construct that accounts for all of the associated data is change, or desire to avoid change. One might argue that in Experiments 1 and 3, the dynamic society condition always supported the Latino culture, so therefore, participants were merely acting in a self-serving fashion – which would still be interesting. However, Experiment 2 holds constant any economic benefits to show that beyond those benefits, prejudice is provoked by anticipated change.

Future studies will directly compare ethnic differences in change perceptions in reaction to different ideologies about cultural change. Cultural inertia predicts different preferences for assimilation and multicultural ideologies for ethnic minority and ethnic majority groups. For ethnic minorities embedded in a larger, dominant culture, calls for an assimilated society normally mean that minority groups are expected to change to fit the norms of the dominant group. This model, which denies the value of their culture and traditions and the reality of their experience of stigma, may be perceived not only as less desirable but also threatening to their personal and social identity (Dovidio, Gaertner, Flores Neimann, & Snider, 2001). Thus, cultural inertia predicts that ethnic minorities will generally prefer multicultural ideologies and show less bias when those ideologies are invoked. In multicultural societies, the dominant groups are required to change to accommodate the multiple cultures.

These findings support the hypothesis that multicultural ideologies have an empowering effect on Latinos and assimilative ideologies disenfranchise cultural minorities. This effect warrants more direct follow-up for several reasons. First, higher CSE for one's own group leads to reduced prejudice toward other groups (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). Also, assimilative ideologies may implicitly cause inequalities across groups to persist. If ethnic minorities have more negative attitudes toward their own group and the majority show greater bias toward minority groups in reaction to assimilative approaches to cultural change (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004), discrimination against ethnic minority groups will be perpetuated by both dominant and minority groups (Jost & Burgess, 2000). Furthermore, according to cultural inertia, ethnic minorities' bias toward ethnic majorities should increase in response to assimilative ideologies. Therefore, assimilation ideologies may lead ethnic minorities to have negative attitudes toward themselves and other groups and will perpetuate ethnic majority bias against ethnic minorities.

Conclusions

In all three studies reported, only change was manipulated. Groups moving into a region was a given. The only question was how much the already existing groups will change to accommodate those groups. Thus, cultural inertia suggests that one avenue to reduce prejudice concerns how one frames the cultural change. For example, will a large immigrant population "force" some individuals to

change their cultural ways to accommodate the group? If so, cultural inertia would predict greater reactivity and prejudice toward that group. Cultural inertia suggests that framing the population shifts as more opportunities for new experiences, without a need to accommodate others, might produce more positive evaluations of the group. This remains a question for future research. The presented studies also failed to manipulate the quality of the change. For instance, new groups might mean having to change one's ways to accommodate that group. New groups might also mean simply new restaurants. In this latter case, there is minimal need for change and only new opportunities. Future research will need to more explicitly define change and to also more explicitly define threat and affirmation. The current research, however, provides a foundation for a new way of considering models of intergroup interaction.

Appendix 1 Change manipulation

We want you to think about how American culture is now and how it will be changing over the next few years. Experts are divided about how the recent census figures regarding ethnic populations are influencing our culture. Some people think that as ethnic minority populations grow in numbers, and more immigrants come to the country, American culture will change dramatically. The culture will become more diverse, with more bilingual populations, more diverse cultural values, and changes to the "American way of life". Schools will have larger ethnic populations, and with it more bilingual education classes. The workforce will also have an increase in minority participation. Minorities will be working in fields that were not available to them before and many will eventually reach managerial positions. Because of the world economy, that diversity will provide more opportunities to expand to new markets. Many Latino holidays will be celebrated frequently in addition to the traditional American holidays. As the diversity increases, so will the number of inter-racial families. As such, American culture, and the people that live in the country, will change and adapt to new cultures and persons. The new culture will be a mosaic of past and new cultures. The diversity will strengthen the American way of life.

Others contend that "traditional" American culture will continue to dominate society. As more groups enter society, they will adopt traditional American culture and change the incoming groups to adopt the current cultural values. Virtually all past immigration groups have followed a similar pattern. Groups merge and adopt the traditional American way of life within a generation. The leaders and people of America will continue to work hard to preserve the "traditional" American culture. Lawmakers will pass laws to help the new immigrants adjust to the American way of life. Most states are adopting, or have adopted, English only laws, providing a framework for a unified American culture. English will be learned by the minorities to follow and understand the American culture. Immigrants will adapt to the American way of life leading to assimilation into the American culture. In the end, a traditional way of life will strengthen our culture and our ability to continue to prosper.

In the following pages, we want your opinions about how American culture is changing regarding views of diversity and assimilation. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your opinions about the future and how America should approach the growing ethnic populations.

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